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INTRODUCTION

Erwin Chemerinsky is broken hearted. 1 "Almost forty years
ago," he writes, "I decided to go to law school because I believed that
law was the most powerful tool for social change and that the
Supreme Court was the primary institution in society that existed to
stop discrimination and to protect people's rights. ' 2 Smitten by the
Court, Chemerinsky was blind to its historical role as a protector of
privilege, and its structural limitations as an agent of progressive
social change. Placing the Court on a pedestal, he abstracted it from
the culture and the society in which it operates. For decades political
scientists, historians, and other scholars have repeatedly shown that
the Court is structurally conservative, institutionally constrained from
furthering the causes that Chemerinsky cherishes, but Chemerinsky
was too enamored to see. But now, thanks to repeated decisions by the
Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts (prominently including, I
suspect, Bush v. Gore3), the romance has been shattered, and
Chemerinsky can see somewhat more clearly. Now he understands
what many have known for at least half a century, if not more: the
Court "has rarely lived up to these lofty expectations and far more
often has upheld discrimination and even egregious violations of basic
liberties." 4 And yet he still longs for his love. "No institution in
society," he writes in the last paragraph in his book, "is more
important than the Supreme Court in ensuring liberty and justice for
all." 5 Chemerinsky is wrong. His romantic, ahistorical, and
unsupported belief in the triumph of rights over politics leads his focus
away from other institutions of government and broader society where
progressive change largely occurs. The Supreme Court can only act on
the margins. Yet the broken-hearted lover still longs for his love.
Chemerinsky's method is to examine Supreme Court decisions
that "both liberals and conservatives today would consider grave
mistakes." 6 His basic argument is several-fold. First, he repeatedly
states that the purpose of the Supreme Court is "to enforce the
Constitution against the will of the majority." 7 More specifically, he
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT (2015).
Id. at 5.
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 6.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 12. In his view, and mine too, they are legion!
Id. at 9.
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writes that the "two preeminent purposes of the Court are to protect
the rights of minorities who cannot rely on the political process and to
uphold the Constitution in the face of repressive desires of political
majorities."8 Chemerinsky's second argument, his "thesis... is that
the Court has largely failed at both of these tasks":
Throughout American history, the Court usually has been on the side of the powerfulgovernment and business-at the expense of individuals whom the Constitution is
designed to protect. In times of crisis, when the passions of the moment have led
to laws
9
that compromise basic rights, the Court has failed to enforce the Constitution.

Chemerinsky's third argument is that all is not lost. The Supreme
Court, he believes, can do better. This includes the Warren Court,
which "could have and should have done so much more." 10 The
judiciary, Chemerinsky writes, "can be a moral leader and protect our
core values from hostile public pressure . . . ."'
In the end,
Chemerinsky "seek[s] to challenge all of us to think more critically
about the Court and to confront the reality that, by any measure, it
has too often failed at its most important responsibilities under the
12
Constitution."
I agree with Chemerinsky's substantive critiques of the many
Supreme Court decisions he discusses and his general understanding
of the conservative role the Supreme Court has played historically and
continues to play. I, too, yearn for a society that does a much better job
protecting individual liberty, the rights of the poor, the relatively
disadvantaged, and political dissidents. I, too, want to live in a more
equal society without discrimination. But unlike Chemerinsky, I do
not look to the Court to produce these results. While Chemerinsky
believes the Supreme Court "could and should have done so much
better,"'13 both history and scholarship teach us that the problem is
much deeper. We as a society get the kind of Supreme Court we want.
The problem is less with the Court and more with the political
preferences of our fellow citizens. When those change so will Supreme
Court decisions. The "CaseAgainst the Supreme Court" would be more
accurately
titled,
"The
Case Against American Society."
Chemerinsky's book is more the story of the intellectual odyssey of a
dedicated liberal than it is a careful, historically-informed analysis of
the role of the Court.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

298.
10.
156.
284.
15.
334.
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In the following pages I will lay out the case that the Supreme
Court is structurally and inherently conservative. Building on decades
of political science and historical research, I will argue that as a
general rule the Court is constitutionally structured so that it cannot
and will not go further in protecting rights and "ensuring liberty and
justice for all" than the public and political elites are willing to accept.
Because the American public holds generally conservative views on
the issues Chemerinsky cares deeply about, so will the Court. On
those rare instances when its decisions do go further, they are unlikely
to be well implemented. The Court is not the mythical institution that
Chemerinsky pines for that can rise above the political, social,
cultural, and economic understandings of the society in which it is
embedded. To treat it as such is the stuff of romance, myth, and
legend. I will conclude by suggesting that the United States would be
better served by a much reduced role for the Supreme Court.

I. THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
Chemerinsky's understanding of the role of the Supreme Court,
to "protect the rights of minorities who cannot rely on the political
process and to uphold the Constitution in the face of any repressive
desires of political majorities," 14 is a relatively modern view. It traces
its roots not to the founding, nor to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but rather to the "most famous footnote" 15 in Supreme
16
Court history: footnote four in the 1938 case of Carolene Products.
In that lengthy footnote, in a case about the power of the federal
government to regulate the interstate shipment of filled-milk
products, Justice Stone suggested that in the future the Court might
apply "more exacting judicial scrutiny" under the Fourteenth
Amendment to "legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation." 17 In paragraph three of the footnote he went further,
raising the possibility of a "more searching judicial inquiry" in the
future for "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ... which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes

14.
15.
Rights:
(1995).
16.
17.

Id. at 10.
Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the PreferredPosition of Individual
Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 277, 277
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Id.
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ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."18 Whatever role the
framers intended the Court to play, this was not their clear and wellsettled understanding. Even the Court's powers were undetermined at
the founding. As Chemerinsky well knows, it was not clear at the
founding that the Supreme Court had the power of judicial review.
The power of judicial review is not explicitly granted in the
Constitution. Rather, it has been implied. For the first half century of
its existence the Court rarely invalidated an Act of Congress on the
grounds of unconstitutionality, arguably doing so only twice as of
1857, nearly seventy years after the ratification of the Constitution. 19
It was not until the later part of the nineteenth century that the Court
began to regularly invalidate congressional acts on grounds of
unconstitutionality, to protect property and privilege against attempts
to regulate them. 20 Even so, over the entire history of the United
States through May 2014, the Court has only invalidated 177 acts of
Congress, fewer than one per year. 21 The historical record is quite
22
clear: the Court has not been an active enforcer of minority rights.
Progressive political activists, as well as defenders of the
wealthy and privileged, have long understood that the Court's role is
not to help "minorities who cannot rely on the political process" but
rather to protect property and privilege against attempts to regulate
them. Arguing for that role in 1886, Professor Christopher G.
Tiedeman warned against progressive movements that demand that
government act to "protect the weak against the shrewdness of the
stronger, to determine what wages a workman shall receive for his
labor, and how many hours daily he shall labor.... " 23 Faced with
these "extraordinary demands," Tiedeman wrote, "the conservative
classes stand in constant fear of the advent of an absolutism more
tyrannical and more unreasoning than any before experienced by
18.

Id. For a classic study of the theory of Footnote 4, see generally JOHN HART ELY,

DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

19. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-79 (1803); see also Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 528-29 (1856).
See generally ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE
20.
ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960).
21.

CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW:

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES TO MAY 23, 2014, S. Doc. No. 112-9, at 2283-2330 (2014), https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/ pkg/GPO-CONAN-2014/pdfIGPO-CONAN-2014.pdf [perma.cc/H45U-MGE7].
22. The Court has invalidated more state laws. As of May 23, 2014, the Congressional
Research Service reports that throughout its history, the Court has invalidated 953 state laws.
S. DOc. NO. 112-9, at 2331-2506 (2014). However, this does not support the claim that the Court
has been an active enforcer of minority rights. Rather, it simply reflects the fact that there are a
large number of states that enact many laws.
23.
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWERS IN THE
UNITED STATES vi (1886).
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man, the absolutism of a democratic majority."24 However, all was not
lost, because the wealthy and the privileged had the protection of the
Constitution and the Court. "The principal object of the present work,"
Tiedeman wrote, is "to awaken the public mind to a full appreciation
of the power of constitutional limitations to protect private rights
against the radical experimentations of social reformers ....
,25 In
1911, then Senator and later Supreme Court Justice George
Sutherland reiterated this view, noting that the "[w]ritten
Constitution . . . is the shelter and the bulwark of what might
otherwise be a helpless minority." 26 The "helpless minority" to whom
he referred was, of course, the wealthy.
In the early twentieth century the Progressives and the labor
movement understood the Court as a defender of the privileged. In
1912, in a speech to the American Federation of Labor, Progressive
Senator Robert M. La Follette blasted the Court for its conservative
decisions, proposing that lower federal court judges be stripped of the
power of judicial review and Congress be given the power to override
Supreme Court decisions invalidating congressional acts. 27 Reflecting
on Supreme Court decisions in 1912, newspaper commentator Jesse F.
Orton facetiously wrote,"[w]ere the Constitution and its Amendments
written this way? Or has some one inserted a 'joker' clause which
favors privilege?" 28 In 1924, the Progressive Party platform called for
the election of federal judges for ten-year terms and a congressional
override of Court decisions. 29 Returning, then, to Chemerinsky, it
appears that he has finally come to see what politicians, political
activists, and their academic proponents have known for more than a
century; that the Court is principally a protector of privilege.
It is not only political activists who have understood the
Court's historic role as a protector of privilege. In an oft-cited article
published in 1957, Robert Dahl investigated whether the Court was a
protector of minorities against majorities, Chemerinsky's asserted role
of the Court. 30 Dahl found this was not the case. "By itself," Dahl
wrote, "the Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national

24.
25.

Id. at vii.
Id. at vii- vii.

26.
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 173 (2009).
27.

WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 50-51 (1962).

28. FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 189.
29. MURPHY, supra note 27, at 51.
30. See generally Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
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policy. 13 1 This is largely for two reasons, explored in the following
sections. First, Dahl argued that due to the appointment process "the
Supreme Court is inevitably part of the dominant national alliance." 32
Second, he discovered that when Congress responded negatively to
Court decisions it did not like, the Court backed down. 33 In addition,
writing nearly sixty years before Chemerinsky, Dahl catalogued the
conservative nature of the Supreme Court. He noted that historically,
rather than protecting minorities against majorities:
[T]he Court used the protections of the Fifth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteen
Amendments to preserve the rights and liberties of a relatively privileged group at the
expense of the rights and liberties of a submerged group: chiefly slaveholders at the
expense of slaves, white people at the expense 3of
colored people, and property holders at
4
the expense of wage earners and other groups.

While Chemerinsky provides an updated list of conservative Supreme
Court decisions, his case against the Supreme Court has been well
known for a very long time.
Robert G. McCloskey, writing a few years after Dahl, also
reached similar conclusions. In his book-length study of the history of
the Supreme Court, first published in 1960 and forthcoming in 2016 in
its sixth edition, McCloskey argued that the Court both supported
majority preferences and remained on the margins of major issues
facing the country. 35 When it tried to do more, McCloskey found, it
risked its independence and its ability to influence society. In
particular, rather than standing up to repressive majorities to protect
minorities, McCloskey argued that the Court "seldom strayed very far
from the mainstreams of American life. '36 Reviewing the role of the
Court over time, McCloskey concluded that it is "hard to find a single
historical instance when the Court has stood firm for very long against
a really clear wave of public demand. ' 37 Further, McCloskey found
that the Court lacked the power to resolve heated controversies. "The
Court's greatest successes have been achieved," McCloskey wrote,
"when it has operated near the margins rather than in the center of
political controversy, when it has nudged and gently tugged the
nation, instead of trying to rule it. 38s In the end, McCloskey concluded,

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 293.
Id.
Id. at 288 tbl.5, 290 tbl.6.
Id. at 292 (citations omitted).

35.

ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (5th ed. 2010).

36.
37.
38.

Id. at 261.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 264.
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the "great fundamental decisions that determine the course of society
must ultimately be made by society itself."39
The arguments of Dahl and McCloskey were elaborated and
built upon in 2009 by two distinguished legal academics, Lucas Powe
Jr. of the University of Texas and Barry Friedman of New York
University. 40 The central argument of both books is that the U.S.
Supreme Court is part of the government and the society in which it
operates, reflecting the views of the society at large. Powe examines
the interests and demands of political elites and how the Court works
with them to further their interests. His "dominant theme is that the
Court is a majoritarian institution" 41 reflecting majority interests, not
protecting minorities. Friedman focuses on public opinion, providing a
"chronicle of the relationship between the popular will and the
Supreme Court as it unfolded over two hundred-plus years of
American history." 42 Like McCloskey, Friedman finds that '"history
shows" that Supreme Court decisions will inevitably "come into line"
with public opinion over time. 43 If the Court deviates from
majoritarian views, it will be disciplined. For example, writing of the
Roberts Court, Friedman states, "[T]he long-run fate of the Roberts
Court is not seriously in doubt; its decisions will fall tolerably within
the mainstream of public opinion, or the Court will be yanked back
44
into line."
Taken together, the work of Dahl, McCloskey, Powe, and
Friedman challenge Chemerinsky's claim that the role of the Court is
to protect the relatively disadvantaged. All four works find that the
Court is not countermajoritarian. That is, because its decisions are in
line with the preferences of political elites and majority views, the
Court's decisions reflect widely held societal views rather than
constrain or impose on them in defense of the relatively
disadvantaged. As long as the political system and broader society are
not committed to reducing privilege, furthering equality, and
protecting rights, neither will be the Court. Chemerinsky's
understanding of the role of the Supreme Court is historically and
institutionally inaccurate.

39.

Id. at 60.

40.

LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-2008, at viii

(2009); FRIEDMAN, supra note 26. For a review of both books, comparing them to the work of
Dahl and McCloskey, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Wonder of It All, 45 TULSA L. REV. 679
(2010).
41.
POWE, supra note 40, at ix.
42.
Friedman, supra note 26, at 4.
43. Id. at 382.
44. Id. at 369.
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II. STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS

The Supreme Court is not an all-powerful institution. It is

institutionally structured by the Constitution to both reflect the
interests of the public and elected officials, and to be unable to
successfully challenge them when they repress minorities. The
selection process the Constitution created is explicitly political, giving
elected officials the power to select Supreme Court justices. This
selection procedure goes a long way towards ensuring that the views
of Supreme Court Justices will be well within the political
mainstream. In addition, the Constitution does not grant the Court
any powers of implementation, making it entirely dependent on the
other branches for the implementation of its decisions. Writing in
1788 in Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton famously noted that the
Court lacked the power of the "sword or the purse" and was uniquely
dependent on the Executive "even for the efficacy of its judgments." 45
Looking to the Court to act in countermajoritarian ways in the face of
these institutional constraints, as Chemerinsky does, mistakes an
institutionally unconstrained, mythical Court for the constitutionally
and politically constrained real one.
A. The Selection Process
Justices do not spring out of Athena's-or in the context of this
work-Chemerinsky's head. They are the product of an explicitly
political process. The U.S. Constitution specifies that justices of the
Supreme Court are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 46 Presidents are not famous for appointing
justices who disagree with them on fundamental issues. Sometimes
they get it wrong, perhaps like the first President Bush's appointment
of Justice Souter. Sometimes justices change their views, as arguably
Justice Blackmun did. And sometimes presidents appoint justices for
non-ideological and political reasons, such as President Eisenhower's
appointments of Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William
Brennan. Yet much more often than not, presidents chose nominees
who, as justices, accurately and consistently reflect the president's
views. Examining the differences between the predicted ideology of
nominees and their voting records once confirmed from 1955-2010,
Professor Geoffrey Stone found that for 17 of 22 justices "their actual
voting records on the Court were reasonably close to their expected

45.
46.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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ideology at the time of nomination."4 7 In addition, presidents
historically have the opportunity to make multiple Supreme Court
appointments. Since the first justices held Court in 1790, 112 people
have served on the Supreme Court. That works out to just about one
appointment every two years. More recently, the rate of appointment
has slowed down. Over the last half century, since President Johnson's
appointment of Abe Fortas in 1965 through the end of 2015, seventeen
justices have been appointed, a rate of one new justice roughly every 2.9 years, or 35 months. This means, that a one-term president is
likely to make one appointment and a two-term president two or three
appointments.
The result of this appointment process, and the frequency with
which appointments occur, means that the views of a majority of
Supreme Court justices are likely to accord with the views of current
and recent presidents and senators. The Warren Court that
Chemerinsky loves was largely made up of appointees of Democratic
presidents. Because Democrats held the presidency for all but eight
years in the thirty-six year period of 1932-1968, only five of the
seventeen justices who served on the Warren Court (including
Warren) were appointed by a Republican president. And two of those
Republican appointees, William Brennan and Warren himself, were
quite liberal. Similarly, because Republicans held the presidency in
twenty-eight of the forty years between 1968 and the election of
Barack Obama in 2008, of the fourteen justices appointed to the
Court, only two were appointed by Democratic presidents. It is no
surprise, then, that Supreme Court decisions largely are in line with
elite and public preferences.
Over the last several decades the Republican Party has become
increasingly conservative. Given this, justices appointed by recent
Republican presidents should be quite conservative. This, indeed, is
the case. Examining the voting records of all forty-three members of
the Supreme Court who served from 1937 to 2008, the five with the
most conservative voting records served or are currently serving on
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts! 4 Even Justice Kennedy, the
"moderate swing justice" on the current Roberts Court, is the tenth

47. Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SuP. CT. REv.
381, 403-04 n.41.
48. They are, in order of their conservative voting, Thomas, Rehnquist, Scalia, Roberts, and
Alito. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational JudicialBehavior: A Statistical Study, 2
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 755, 782-83 tbl.3 (2009). For a graphic presentation of the data, see The
Vanishing Liberal Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2009/
02/01/weekinreview/20090201_LIPTAKGRFK.html
[https://perma.cc/JQ2S9UVM] (citing a
study conducted by the University of Chicago).
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most conservative justice to have served over this period. The point is
that the membership of the Court is constitutionally structured to
reflect the political preferences of the President and the Senate. When
voters prefer one party over an extended period of time, the Court
inevitably comes to reflect that party's interests and preferences.
Chemerinsky should not blame the Court for decisions he does not
like, but rather the electorate or, more broadly, the American people.
B. The Limits of JudicialIndependence
The preceding discussion showed that the Supreme Court is
unlikely to protect minorities or limit repressive majorities in large
part because the selection procedure for Supreme Court justices is
political, producing justices who reflect majority preferences. But what
happens if the Court, for whatever reasons, makes decisions not in
line with public or elite preferences? In such circumstances, can it
protect minorities against majority prejudice? In Chemerinsky's view,
the answer should be yes. After all, justices have life tenure and a
constitutional guarantee that their salaries will not be lowered.
However, such an idealistic viewpoint overlooks the various tools
Congress and the President have to constrain the Court. These
include, among others, the ability to alter the Court's jurisdiction,
control its budget, overrule its statutory decisions, decline to
implement its decisions by refusing to provide funding or enforce its
mandate, and decline to raise the justices' salaries. 49 A wellestablished body of work finds that when faced with credible threats
from Congress or the President to use one or more of these tools, the
Court responds by reversing or moderating the line of decisions that
were out of line with majority preferences.
In an article published in 1992, I identified nine periods of
intense congressional hostility to the Supreme Court and examined
how the Court responded. 50 I found that in six of the nine periods the
Court either acquiesced to Congress and reversed its unpopular
opinions or backed off. In the three periods where the Court
maintained its positions, general elections occurred in which Court

49. See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, JudicialIndependence and the Reality of Political
Power, 54 REV. OF POL. 369 (1992). For a discussion of congressional action to punish the justices
for their reapportionment decisions by lowering the amount of a proposed pay raise, see Walter
F. Murphy, Deeds Under a Doctrine: Civil Liberties in the 1963 Term, 59 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 64,
64 (1965) ('Three thousand dollars a year poorer because of their work in recent terms, the
Justices were reminded of one use for congressional control of the purse strings.").
50. Rosenberg, supra note 49, at 379 tbl.1.
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opponents were soundly defeated, removing the threats to the Court. 51
One of the most interesting periods occurred in the 1950s when
southern segregationists teamed up with cold warriors and law-andorder supporters to threaten the Court over its recent decisions on
civil rights, subversion, and the rights of criminal defendants. 52 In
response, the Court reversed its subversion decisions and refrained
from further development of its decisions on civil rights and the rights
of criminal defendants until the political climate changed in the
1960s. 53 The clear finding of this and other studies is that the Court is
unable to protect minorities from repressive majorities, even if it
54
wishes to do so.
The Court's inability to protect individuals against repressive
majorities is clearly seen in times of crisis. 55 Chemerinsky
acknowledges this, writing that "[w]henever there has been a crisis,
56
especially a foreign-based crisis, the response has been repression."
But as the crisis recedes, and the public relaxes, the Court has more
leeway to protect rights. This is exactly what happened in the wake of
the terrorist attack on New York City on September 11, 2001. In
January 2002, just a few months after the attack, forty-seven percent
of respondents told Gallup that they would be willing to have their
"basic civil liberties" violated if "necessary to prevent additional
attacks of terrorism in the U.S." But over time their fear diminished.
A year after the attacks that percentage had dropped to thirty-three
percent. And two years later, in both August and November, 2003, by
better than two-to-one, respondents were unwilling to have their basic
liberties violated. 57 Similarly, starting in 1999 the First Amendment
Center read respondents the First Amendment and then asked them if
it "goes too far in the rights its guarantees?" In 1999 and 2000,
twenty-eight percent and twenty-two percent of respondents
respectively said that it did. In the wake of the terrorist attack, in the

51. One example of this occurred in 1924 when the Progressive Party adopted several
court-curbing planks in its party platform. However, Robert La Follette, its presidential
candidate, received only seventeen percent of the vote, signaling the Court that the threat of
congressional action lacked popular support and was not credible. See Murphy, suprahote 27, at
52.
52. For a fascinating study of this episode, see id.
53. Rosenberg, supra note 49, at 389-94.
54.

See generally TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMiTs OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (2011).

55. Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005)
("The justices are, in fact, significantly more likely to curtail rights and liberties during times of
war and other international threats.').
56. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 1, at 59.
57. GALLUP HISTORICAL TRENDS: CIVIL LIBERTIES, GALLUP (Mar. 15, 2016)
http://www.gallup.com/poll/5263/Civil-Liberties.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q4RP-DJZV].
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summer of 2002, more respondents thought the First Amendment
went too far (forty-nine percent) than thought it did not (forty-seven
percent). However, by 2006 and 2007 the responses reverted to
roughly their pre-September 11, 2001 levels, eighteen percent and
5
twenty-five percent, respectively. 8
I present these figures because they help explain a decision of
the Court, Boumediene v. Bush, 59 that Chemerinsky writes is "a
strong example refuting my thesis that the Court fails to enforce the
Constitution in times of crisis."60 When looked at through the lens of
public opinion, it is clear that in 2008 the public was much less
concerned about terrorism, and more willing to protect rights than it
had been earlier. Further, 2008 was an election year and the virtually
certain presidential candidates at the time the decision was handed
down in June, Senators John McCain and Barack Obama, had both
made clear their opposition to the policies of President Bush. The
justices were likely aware that they would not be threatened for siding
with Lakhdar Boumediene. The decision in Boumediene fits nicely into
the literature on the relationship between the Court, the other
branches, and public opinion.
The sensitivity of the justices to elections was poked fun at over
one hundred years ago. In 1901, Finley Peter Dunne's fictional
character, Mr. Dooley, opined that "th' supreme coort follows th'
iliction returns. ' 61 Writing in 1937, in the wake of the Court's
capitulation to President Roosevelt's court-packing plan, then
Professor Felix Frankfurter wrote to Justice Harlan Stone, "I must
confess I am not wholly happy in thinking that Mr. Dooley should, in
the course of history turn out to have been one of the most
distinguished legal philosophers." 62 Taken as a whole, Chemerinsky's
longings for a countermajoritarian Court that protects politically
unpopular minorities is an admirable fiction, part of a romantic myth
that confuses rights with reality.

58. State
of
the
First Amendment
2007,
FIRST
AMENDMENT
CENTER,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madisonlwp-content/uploads/2011/03/SOFA2007results
.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) [https://perma.cc/77KV-HFWU].
59. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
60. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 85.
61. Peter Dunne Finley, The Supreme Court's Decisions, in MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 21, 26
(1901).
62. David M. O'Brien, "The Imperial Judiciary:" of Paper Tigers and Socio.Legal
Indicators, 2 J.L. & POL. 1, 22 (1985) (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard
Law Sch., to Justice Harlan Stone (Oct. 15, 1937) (on file in Library of Congress, Manuscript
Div., Stone Papers, Frankfurter File)).
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III. COURTS AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

The insights of Dahl, McCloskey, Powe, and Friedman, along
with understandings derived from the judicial appointment process
and the institutional limits on the Court, help explain several
important decisions over the last several decades, some of which
Chemerinsky discusses. In the following section I briefly discuss, first,
the Court's dismal record of protecting political dissent in times of
crisis and, second, several of the Court's most famous decisions
protecting the rights of disadvantaged minorities. I show that these
decisions, although radically different in outcomes, share in common
the fact that they reflected public opinion and elite beliefs. The
underlying point is that the Court, and the justices who serve on it,
are the products of the political system and culture in which they live.
To ask them to step out of it, and to berate them when they don't, as
Chemerinsky does, is to focus on the symptoms of a conservative
political culture, not its cause.
A. Dissident Speech, Racial Minorities,and War
In chapter two, Chemerinsky discusses Court decisions that
repressed political speech critical of the United States during World
War I and the Cold War. These decisions, although disappointing, are
not surprising. It was not until 1965, nearly 175 years after the
adoption of the First Amendment, that the Court first invalidated an
Act of Congress on free speech grounds.6 3 Moreover, the decisions
reflected elite and majority preferences. In 1917 and 1918 Congress
passed the Espionage Act 6 4 and the Sedition Act, 6 5 in essence making
it a crime to criticize the government. In late 1919 and early 1920, the
Department of Justice launched the so-called "Palmer Raids," aimed
at arresting political dissidents and deporting immigrants who held
"radical" political views. It is no surprise, then, that the justices,
products of the political system, acted in similar ways. Similarly, in
1951, in Dennis v. U.S.,66 the Court upheld, by a vote of 7-2, the
conviction of the leaders of the American Communist Party for
conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government by force.
Their "crime" was reading and teaching four Marxist texts.

63.
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
64. Espionage Act, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified in scattered sections of
22 & 50 U.S.C. (2012)).
65.
Sedition Act, Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (repealed 1920).
66.
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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In upholding the convictions in Dennis, the Court was following
elite and public opinion. Starting in 1947, federal, state, and local
governments, as well as some private employers such as universities,
began requiring current and potential employees to swear loyalty
oaths as a condition of employment. Executive Order 9835 (1947), for
example, required an investigation into the loyalty of every person
seeking or holding employment with the United States. Section 9(h) of
the Taft-Hartley Act of 194767 required every union officer to swear
that "he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with
such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or
supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of
the United States Government by force or by any illegal or
unconstitutional methods." In 1950 Congress enacted the Internal
Security Act of 1950, aimed at silencing dissent. 68 The American Bar
Association joined the fight when its House of Delegates voted in 1951
that all state and local bar associations expel from their ranks any
member of the Communist Party or anyone who "advocates MarxismLeninism... "69 And public opinion overwhelmingly supported these
repressive measures. In 1953 and 1954, for example, Gallup and the
Michigan Survey Research Center found that only twenty-nine
percent and twenty-seven percent of respondents, respectively would
allow "a person known to favor Communism" or an "admitted
Communist" to make a public speech. 70 From 1953 to 1964, no more
than twenty percent of respondents told the National Opinion
Research Center (NORC) that Communists should be allowed to speak
on the radio. 71 To wish that the Court would act differently is
understandable; to expect it to do so is historically, politically, and
institutionally naive.
The Cold War repression to which the Supreme Court lent its
support is all the more telling when compared to the treatment
political dissidents received in other democratic nations. The United
Kingdom, France, and Australia all dealt with issues of domestic
subversion and Communism in the Cold War years. In comparison to
the United States, none of the three countries had a full-fledged First
Amendment, and neither the United Kingdom nor France had a
tradition of judicial review whereby courts could invalidate the acts of
67. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 143 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2012)).
68. Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 831, 832, 834, 835
(2012)).
69. Proceedings of the House of Delegates: February 26-27, Chicago, 37 A.B.A. J. 309, 31213 (1951).
70. Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Freedom of Speech, 34 PUB.OP. Q. 483, 489 (1970).
71. Id. at 488.
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the other branches of government. Further, both Britain and France
were "weaker militarily and economically" than the United States,
72
and, in terms of "proximity," both were closer to the Soviet Union.
Yet despite these differences, all three countries did a substantially
better job in protecting political dissent than did the United States.
Indeed, in Australia the voters rejected a referendum outlawing the
Communist Party. The United States' treatment of political dissent in
the Cold War years stands out among western democratic nations,
being characterized by Dahl as a "deviant case" 73 and, more bluntly by
Shapiro, as "pathological." 74 A repressive political culture produced
justices who shared its views. How could it be otherwise?
Perhaps no case more powerfully and poignantly illustrates the
Court's unwillingness to protect even the most fundamental civil
liberties and civil rights when popular and elite support are lacking
than Korematsu v. United States (1944). 75 In this World War II case
the Court upheld the conviction of Fred Korematsu, an American
citizen born in the United States, for remaining near his home in
California in a military control area in violation of an Executive Order
requiring all persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast to report
to Civilian Control Stations. As commentators have repeatedly pointed
out, none of the 112,000 or so people of Japanese ancestry subject to
the order, including approximately 70,000 U.S. citizens, was charged
with a crime.76 No evidence was presented that they had violated any
laws and no hearings were held. Yet they were all shipped to what
were in essence prisoner-of-war camps where they remained
throughout the war. 77 It is hard to imagine a more blatant violation of
civil liberties. Indeed, in 1988 Congress agreed, enacting legislation
giving all living survivors of the camps a $20,000 payment. In
addition, Congress offered an apology: "For these fundamental
violations of the basic civil liberties and constitutional rights of these

72. Herbert H. Hyman, England and America: Climates of Tolerance and Intolerance, in
THE RADICAL RIGHT 269, 274 (1964). Although Hyman was writing about Britain, his statements
apply to France as well.
73. Robert A. Dahl, Epilogue to POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 391
(Robert A. Dahl, ed. 1966).
74.

Martin Shapiro, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 109

(1966).
75.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
76.
See e.g., PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT CASES (1983); U.S. COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 3 (1983); Eugene Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A
Disaster,54 YALE L. J. 489, 496-97 (1945).

77.

Rostow, supra note 76, at 502 (noting the "camps were in fact concentration camps").

THE BROKEN-HEARTED LOVER

2016]

1091

individuals of Japanese ancestry, Congress apologizes on behalf of the
78
nation."
To be clear, like Chemerinsky, I am outraged by these
decisions. But unlike Chemerinsky, I do not expect the Court to
behave differently. The justices are the product of the political system
and generally share its biases and prejudices. Historically, the Court
has supported repressive majorities against vulnerable minorities.
Civil liberties have only been protected when there has been more
than a minimum of elite and popular support for them. 79 Looking to
the Court to protect core freedoms is unlikely to work. Elliott
Richardson put the point well, writing more than half a century ago:
The great battles for free expression will be won, if they are won, not in courts but in
committee rooms and protest-meetings, by editorials and letters to Congress, and
80
through the courage of citizens everywhere.

B. Vindicating Rights
The history of the Court's treatment of people of color, women,
and the relatively disadvantaged is not all doom and gloom. There
have been some victories. Inevitably, they occur when there is elite
and popular support for them. In this section I briefly consider several
examples.
In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education,8 1 a unanimous
Supreme Court invalidated racial segregation in public elementary
and secondary schools. At the time, seventeen southern and border
states, plus the District of Columbia, either permitted or required
such segregation by law. This meant, of course, that school
segregation was not legally mandated in the majority of states and
was limited to the states of the old Confederacy and border states.
The United States repeatedly urged the Court to invalidate laws
requiring segregation, appearing as an amicus in cases such as Shelley
8 3 McLaurin v.
v. Kraemer, 2 Sweatt v. Painter,
Oklahoma,8 4 and on re-

78.
Civil Liberties Act, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 904 (1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 4202 (2012)).
79.
For a more detailed examination of this argument, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The
Sorrow and the Pity: Kent State, Political Dissent and the Misguided Worship of the First
Amendment, in THE BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ORDER IN A DEMOCRATIC

SOCIETY 17-37 (2001).
80. Elliott L. Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 54 (1951).

81.
82.
83.
84.

347
334
339
339

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

483 (1954).
1 (1948).
629 (1950).
637 (1950).
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argument in Brown itself. President Truman's Committee on Civil
Rights called for an end to segregation in its 1947 report, "To Secure
These Rights."8 5 And the little public opinion data that exists on the
question of racial segregation in public schools suggests that by 1950,
four years before Brown, only a minority of Americans supported
school segregation. When asked about whether they thought that
eventually children of all races would go to school together, including
86
in the south, over half of respondents who had an opinion said yes.
While intense white opposition in the South and lack of presidential
support prevented implementation, school desegregation had
substantial support. 87
Roe v. Wade88 is another example of a Supreme Court decision
with substantial elite and popular support at the time it was
decided.8 9 In January, 1973, when Roe was decided, there was little
political opposition to it on the federal level, widespread support
among professional elites, successful law reform movements in
seventeen states, large and rapidly increasing numbers of legal
abortions being performed, and growing public support. Four states,
including New York, had repealed their prohibitions on abortions.
Seventy-five leading national groups endorsed the repeal of all
abortion laws between 1967 and the end of 1972, including twentyeight religious and twenty-one medical groups. Among the religious
groups, support ranged from the American Jewish Congress to the
American Baptist Convention. Medical groups included the American
Public Health Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the
American Medical Association, the National Council of ObstetricsGynecology, and the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists. Among other groups, support included the American
Bar Association and a host of liberal organizations. Even the YWCA
supported repeal. And in 1972, the year before Roe, there were nearly
600,000 legal abortions performed in the United States.
In his zeal to defend his lost love, Chemerinsky
mischaracterizes my work on Roe, writing that I argue that it "made

85.

PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS (1947).

86. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Roper Commercial Survey, LIFE MAGAZINE,
July 1950, at Q12, Q13A.
87. That support manifested itself with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the
1965 Voting Rights Act. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 42-172 (2d ed., 2008).
88. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
89. For an in-depth study of the support for legal abortion prior to Roe, see ROSENBERG,
supra note 87, at 175-201, 247-68.
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little difference." 90 That is emphatically not my argument! Roe made a
difference, but an uneven one. It made a difference for two reasons:
the support for legal abortion noted above and the ability of market
forces (clinics) to meet that demand, overcoming implementation
constraints. To repeat a fundamental point that Chemerinsky, and
others, often overlook; in the year before Roe there were nearly
600,000 legal abortions performed in the United States, a result of
political action and organizing. However, since Roe, implementation
has been uneven. In states where there is less support for access to
abortion, legal abortions are virtually impossible to obtain. In 2011,
for example, thirty-eight percent of women lived in counties with no
abortion providers. 91 In 2015, there were five states that had only one
abortion provider. 92 As the executive director of a Missoula, Montana
abortion clinic destroyed by arson in 1993 put it, "It does no good to
93
have the [abortion] procedure be legal if women can't get it."
A revealing comparison that underscores the point that the
Court protects minorities and the relatively disadvantaged when there
is elite and popular support to do so can be seen by comparing two
cases on gay rights, Bowers v. Hardwick94 in 1986 and Lawrence v.
Texas 95 in 2003. In Bowers, the Court upheld a Georgia law that
criminalized sodomy defined as oral or anal sex. Justice White,
writing for the Court, noted that "today, 24 States and the District of
Columbia" criminalize sodomy. 96 He might also have pointed out that
in 1986 only thirty-two percent of respondents to a Gallup Poll said
that "homosexual relations between consenting adults should ...be
legal." 97 Add to this the full-blown AIDS crisis and the decision is no
surprise. Yet seventeen years later, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
reversed itself and struck down a Texas law that specifically targeted
sodomy with a same-sex partner. In invalidating the Texas law,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted the "emerging

90.
91.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 289.
Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the

United States, 2011, 46 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 3 (2014).

92. Esm6 E. Deprez, The Vanishing U.S. Abortion Clinic, BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE,
(December 8, 2015, 11:48 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/abortion-and-thedecline-of-clinics [https://perma.ccfV4A9-GBLL].
93. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Real World of ConstitutionalRights: The Supreme Court and
the Implementation of the Abortion Decisions, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 417 (Lee Epstein
ed.,1995).
94. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
95. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
96. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193.
97. Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP (1986), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/Gay-LesbianRights.aspx [https://perma.cc/7F9L-B9F5].
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awareness" of changing views. 98 He explicitly compared state
legislation at the time of Bowers to the situation in 2003: "The 25
States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the
Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws
only against homosexual conduct." 99 He might have added, too, that in
response to the same Gallup Poll question noted above in May, 2003,
the month before the Lawrence opinion was delivered, sixty percent of
respondents thought that homosexual relations between consenting
adults should be legal. 100
A final example of the Court protecting minorities when there
is elite and public support to do so is marriage equality. In Obergefell
v. Hodges,10 1 in 2015, the Court invalidated state prohibitions on
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. At the time there was
large and growing elite and popular support for marriage equality. In
terms of elite support, President Obama announced his support for
marriage equality in May 2012, and the Democratic Party endorsed
marriage equality in its 2012 party platform. As early as 2013, a
majority of U.S. Senators supported it. Major American corporations
supported it as did a group of more than three hundred Republican
party activists who filed a brief in Obergefell in support. Similarly,
public opinion polls recorded majority support for marriage equality,
with Gallup recording consistent majority support starting in 2012102
and other polls recording majority support somewhat earlier. 10 3 The
point is that when the Court issues liberal decisions that Chemerinsky
supports, it is likely that there is pre-existing elite and public support
for them. The Court, rather than protecting disadvantaged minorities
against repressive majorities, is reflecting public opinion and elite
support, typically against local outliers.

98. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
99. Id. at 573.
100. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 97; see also Karlyn Bowman, Andrew Rugg &
Jennifer Marsico, Polls on Attitudes on Homosexuality & Gay Marriage,AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INST. FOR PUB. POLY RES. 6 (Mar. 2013) (noting the growing acceptance of homosexuality in the
United States).
101. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
102. Justin McCarthy, Record-High 60% ofAmericans Support Same-Sex Marriage,GALLUP
(May 19, 2015), http://www.gailup.com/poll/183272/record-high-americans-support-sex-marriage
.aspx?utmsource=SAME_SEXRELATIONS&utm_medium--topic&utm campaign--tiles
[https://perma.cc/E5ZU-2EUQ].
103. Nate Silver, Gay MarriageOpponentsNow in Minority, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 20,
2011), http://nyti.ms/19JbWOZ [https://perma.cc/HN87-J5QR].
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IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION

It is one thing to win a Supreme Court decision in favor of the
rights of minorities. It is quite another for that decision to be
implemented, to actually change the lives of the people it purports to
help. As I noted earlier in this article, the Court lacks the power of the
sword or the purse, the power to compel compliance with its decisions
through financial incentives or physical force. However, Chemerinsky
overlooks the institutional constraints on courts, uncritically
assuming that Supreme Court decisions are implemented easily and
un-problematically. No one would make such claims about acts of
Congress, the President, or the bureaucracy. Yet Chemerinsky, so
enamored of the mythical Court, writes as if the Court is somehow
freed of the implementation challenges facing other institutions. Two
examples illustrate how Chemerinsky is wrong on this point.
A. Rights of CriminalDefendants
Chemerinsky gushes with his praise of the Warren Court
decisions on the rights of criminal defendants. In particular, he points
to Gideon v. Wainwright,10 4 the case that held that indigent criminal
defendants facing possible imprisonment were entitled to lawyers at
no cost, and Miranda v. Arizona,10 5 holding that before questioning
people held in custody, police must inform them of a prescribed set of
rights. Chemerinsky believes that these decisions are "unquestionably
successes for the Supreme Court that made American society
better."1 0 6 But how does he know? He does not cite or discuss any
literature that has measured the differences these decisions have
made in the choices and behavior of criminal defendants, particularly
those who are indigent.
There is a well-established and long-standing literature that
finds that the Warren Court's criminal rights revolution did not make
very much difference for indigent criminal defendants. 107 This is due
to insufficient funding, the enormous power imbalance between the
police and the people they hold in custody, and a general lack of a
societal commitment to the rights of criminal defendants. Although
police resisted the Miranda requirements at first, they soon
discovered they could turn them to their advantage. Studies have

104. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

105. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
106. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 137.
107. For a summary of this literature, see ROSENBERG, supra note 87, at 304-38.
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repeatedly found that given the enormous power imbalance between
the police and those in custody, the police are usually able to persuade
those in custody that the rights have little value. Thus, Chemerinsky
is correct that "[Miranda] has become widely accepted,"10 8 but this is
not because the Supreme Court has successfully protected the rights
of criminal defendants. David Simon, a journalist, spent a year
observing Baltimore homicide detectives. He describes a conversation
with a detective and a suspect in custody this way:
[H]e [the detective] wants you [the suspect] to know-and he's been doing this a lot
longer than you, so take his word for it-that your rights to remain silent and obtain
qualified counsel aren't all they're cracked up to be... Once you up and call for the
lawyer, son, we can't do a damn thing for you.., once I walk out of this room any
chance you have of telling your side of the story is gone and I gotta write it up the way it
looks. 109

Police learned pretty quickly that if those in custody signed forms
acknowledging that they had been given their Miranda warnings,
then any statements and confessions they went on to make were
protected from legal challenge. As early as 1970, Leiken, examining
police practice in Denver, found that the police had learned that "one
of the latent functions of Miranda ... appears to be to aid the police in
overcoming their evidentiary burden with respect to proving the
suspect's knowledge and waiver of his constitutional rights." 110
Summing up the impact of Miranda in 1987, Schulhofer concluded
that it has not delivered "even a fraction of what it seems to
promise."1 1 '
The provision of counsel to indigent criminal defendants facing
possible imprisonment, announced first in Gideon and expanded in
Argersinger v. Hamlin112 in 1972, also has not greatly improved the
life of indigent criminal defendants. This is largely the result of
insufficient funding and the incentives of the judicial process.
Malcolm Feeley spent six months sitting in a criminal court room in
New Haven, Connecticut in the late 1970s, observing the proceedings.
Cataloging over 1,600 criminal court cases, Feeley discovered that
only half of the defendants were represented by counsel and that
"[r]oughly 20 percent of those charged with felonies, and one-third of
those receiving jail sentences, were not represented by counsel." In not

108. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 136.
109. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS (1991), quoted in LAW &
SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW 566 (Stewart Macauley et al. eds., 1995).

110. Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogationin Colorado:The Implementation of Miranda,
47 DENVER L.J. 1, 48 (1970).
111. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 892 (1981).
112. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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one case out of the over 1,600+ that Feeley observed did a defendant
request a trial. 113 "In court," Feeley writes, "the prosecutor's first
question to an unrepresented defendant is: 'Do you want to get your
own attorney, apply for a public defender, or get your case over with
today?' 114 For those who could not make bail, the choice was even
starker. As Feeley understood the incentive structure presented to
criminal defendants, the constitutional rights the Supreme Court
required did not help: "When the choice is between freedom for those
who plead guilty and jail for those who want to invoke their right to
11 5
trial, there is really no choice at all."
More recent work has corroborated the failure of the criminal
justice system to implement the rights the Court has held are
constitutionally required. In 1987, in a nearly four-hundred-page
study of treatment of the poor in New York City courts, McConville
and Mirsky found woefully inadequate representation. 116 In 2004, the
American Bar Association issued a report. Its title, "Gideon's Broken
Promise," conveys the findings. The "disturbing conclusion[s]" of the
report were that
thousands of persons are processed through America's courts every year either with no
lawyer at all or with a lawyer who does not have the time, resources, or in some cases
the inclination to provide effective representation. All too often, defendants plead
guilty, even if they are innocent, without really understanding their legal rights or what
is occurring ....117

Further, in 2009, the National Right to Counsel Committee of the
Constitution Project published a major report on the provision of
counsel to indigent criminal defendants. The Honorary Co-Chairs of
the Committee were Walter F. Mondale, who served as Vice-President
of the United States from 1997 to 1981 in the Carter Administration
and William S. Sessions, Director of the FBI in the administration of
George H. W. Bush. Here, too, its title, "Justice Denied," neatly
summarized its findings. Noting that Gideon was decided more than
45 years earlier, the report finds woeful inadequacies in the provision
of counsel:
Yet, today, in criminal and juvenile proceedings in state courts, sometimes counsel is
not provided at all, and it often is supplied in ways that make a mockery of the great
promise of the Gideon decision and the Supreme Court's soaring rhetoric. Throughout

113.

MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 9, 9-10 (1979).

114. Id. at 220.
115. Id. at 206.
116. See generally Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, CriminalDefense of the Poor in
New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581 (1987).
117. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICANS CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE

iv (2004).
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the United States, indigent defense systems are struggling. Due to funding shortfalls,
excessive caseloads, and a host of other problems, many are truly failing .... 118

To be fair to Chemerinsky, he shows awareness of the dismal
treatment of the poor in court. He notes that police have "discovered
that Miranda did not keep them from gaining confessions" 119 and that
in practice the "constitutional assurance of the right to counsel is
rendered illusory. . -120 He notes, too, that from 2008-2011 forty-two
states cut funding to their courts. 121 Yet somehow he thinks this is the
fault of the Supreme Court, not the broader society. For Chemerinsky
the problem seems to be that "the Supreme Court created a mandate
without securing adequate funding. .... ,"122 Even in the face of all this
evidence Chemerinsky cannot shake his romantic faith in the Court.
We have no reason to believe that a different Court decision would
have produced different results. Unless and until the society commits
to ensuring adequate resources for the defense of indigent criminal
defendants, there is virtually nothing the Court will be able to do.
Despite the consistent findings noted above, Chemerinsky still
clings to the importance of the Court, writing that the "importance of
Gideon as a symbol [ ] cannot be overstated." 123 In addition to not
providing a shred of evidence for this assertion, the facts on the
ground show that the symbol is practically meaningless. Writing in
the "Foreword" to the Harvard Law Review in 1970, Michael Tigar
powerfully made the point:
"..

mhe

constitutional revolution in criminal procedure has amounted to little more than
an ornament, or golden cupola, built upon the roof of a structure found rotting and
infested, assuring the gentlefolk who only pass by without entering that all is well
inside. 124

B. School Desegregationand Civil Rights
School desegregation provides a second example of
implementation difficulties for "landmark" Supreme Court decisions.
In 1954, a unanimous Supreme Court invalidated laws requiring

118. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, JUSTICE DENIED:
AMERICAN'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 2 (2009),

http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp.contentluploads/2012/10/139.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SE8UT6LQ].
119. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 137.
120. Id. at 150.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 154.
123. Id. at 134.
124. Michael E. Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of ConstitutionalRights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1970).
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racial segregation in public elementary and secondary schools in
Brown v. Board of Education.125 The decision was followed by a series
of largely per curiam decisions invalidating racial segregation in
public parks and recreation facilities, in intrastate and interstate
commerce, in courtrooms, and in facilities in public buildings. "These
cases," Chemerinsky writes, "dramatically changed society and are a
126
powerful example of what the Court exists to accomplish."
Countless legal scholars have praised Brown, 127 including
Chemerinsky. "Brown's significance," he writes, "cannot be
12 8
overstated."
Oh yes it can! As a factual matter, it did not lead to either
short-term or long-lasting school desegregation. The school
desegregation that was achieved was the direct result of congressional
action. In particular, it was the result of the passage of Title VI of the
1964 Civil Right Act, which prohibited federal funding of programs
that discriminated, and the 1965 Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, which provided substantial federal funds to poor school
districts. 129 As I have shown in detail, the passage of these bills was
independent of Brown and other Court decisions. 130
Chemerinsky admits that the public schools of the United
States are increasingly and highly racially segregated. "Ironically," he
writes, "the area of society that remains most segregated, where the
Supreme Court has most failed, is the one that was the focus of
Brown: public school education. American public schools are racially
separate, and this segregation is increasing at an accelerating rate." 131
There is nothing ironic about this. It only appears ironic if one has an
uncritical belief that Supreme Court opinions are implemented unproblematically. The United States has racially segregated public
schools because it has racially segregated housing. The actions of
white people show very clearly that they prefer to live in all or mostly
white neighborhoods and to send their children to all or mostly white
schools. The National Center for Education Statistics's most recent
estimates, for the 2015-2016 school year, were that white, non125. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
126. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 127.
127. See ROSENBERG, supra note 87, at 39-40 (providing numerous quotations praising the
Brown decision).
128. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 125.
129. See ROSENBERG, supra note 87, at 99 tbl.3.2 (providing sweeping statistical data
detailing different states' reception of federal funds and integration of schools throughout the
1960s).
130. See id. at 107-56 (providing an examination of the mentioned bills' passages in relation
to judicial civil rights decisions).
131. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 138.
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Hispanic students would comprise 49.3% of public school students
132
from pre-kindergarten through grade twelve, less than a majority.
Compare this with the finding that in 2009 about seven-in-ten (73%)
of the estimated 4.7 million children enrolled in kindergarten through
grade twelve in private schools were white.133 In the city of Chicago,
with the fourth largest school district in the country, only 9.4% of
public school children are white.134 While Chicago may have the
nation's most racially segregated public school system, other large
cities are not far behind. 135
According to Chemerinsky, the Supreme Court "deserves a
good deal of the blame" for the segregated nature public schools in the
United States.1 36 He argues: "The Warren Court could have done
much more to bring about desegregation. It did not need to wait a
decade after Brown, in 1954, before declaring that there had been all
too much deliberation and not enough speed ... ,"137 If only it were
this easy to bring about change! Chemerinsky overlooks the lack of
political and social support for the Court's decision in the states with
segregated schools, and the unwillingness of national leaders to
compel them to act until Congress acted in 1964. An unidentified
Justice, showing more political awareness than Chemerinsky,
reportedly explained the Court's refusal to hear an anti-miscegenation

132. See Fast Facts, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display
.asp?id=372 [https://perma.cc/4WZE-73ZE ] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016) (estimating that 24.7
million of the projected 50.1 million public school students entering prekindergarten through
grade twelve in 2015 will be white, non-Hispanic).
133. Jens Manuel Krogstad and Richard Fry, Dept. of Ed. Projects Public Schools Will Be
'Majority-Minority'this Fall, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.pewresearch
.org/fact-tank/20 14/08/18/u-s-public-schools-expected-to-be.majority-minority-starting-this-fall/
[https://perma.cc/J3ZC-HVYZ].
134. CPS Stats and Facts, CHI. PUB. SCH. (Mar. 9, 2016), http://cps.edu/AboutCPS/At-aglance/Pages/Stats-and-facts.aspx [https://perma.cc/9ZTU-224U]. But see 2016 Largest School
Districts in America, NICHE.cOM, https://kl2.niche.com/rankings/public-school-districts/largestenrollment/ [https://perma.cc/WQU9-QNJB ] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016) (reporting Chicago
Public Schools as the third largest school district in the United States for 2016 based on student
enrollment).
135. See Ford Fessenden, A Portraitof Segregation in New York City's Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(May 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/1l/nyregion/segregation-in-newyork-city-public-schools.html?ref=education
[https://perma.cc/R8KJ-MR2N]
(providing
infographic detailing the high percentage of segregation in a number of large cities' public school
systems, including Chicago, Dallas, and New York).
136. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 138-39.
137. Id. at 156.
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case (Naim v. Naim138 ) in the year following Brown with the following
statement: "One bombshell at a time is enough."' 3 9
Chemerinsky's critique of the Court's desegregation decisions is
not limited to the Warren Court. He points to two decisions of the
Burger Court, Milliken v. Bradley140 and San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez'4 ' which, he writes, have had an
"enormous" negative effect on desegregation. 142 In the former, the
Court overturned an inter-district desegregation plan which included
both Detroit and some of its suburbs. In Rodriguez, the Court declined
to invalidate school funding schemes that resulted in schools in poor
locations having fewer resources than those in wealthier ones. In
Chemerinsky's Court-centric view, the "promise in Brown of equal
educational opportunities has been unfulfilled because of the Supreme
Court's failures."' 43 The data suggest not. The promise of a racially
equal society has not been achieved because white Americans are not
sufficiently committed to that promise. The "Black Lives Matter"
movement is a chilling reminder that the United States was built on a
belief in white racial supremacy that still exerts far too strong a pull
on too many white people. There is nothing the Supreme Court can do
about that. While I share Chemerinsky's critique of cases like Milliken
and Rodriguez, the problem lies much deeper than disappointing
Supreme Court decisions. In criticizing Chief Justice Taney's decision
in Dred Scott, the women's right leader Susan B. Anthony poignantly
made this point: "Judge Taney's decision, infamous as it is, is but the
reflection of the spirit and practice of the American people, North as
44
well as South."'
In sum, while it is true that on occasion the Court has acted to
protect the rights of the relatively disadvantaged, implementation of
these decisions has been at best uneven and at worst, largely lacking.
This is because the Court is dependent on public opinion and elite
138. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated per curiam, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), cert. dismissed, 350
U.S. 985 (1956) (dismissed for lack of a properly presented federal question).
139. STEPHEN L. WASBY, ANTHONY A. D'AMATO & ROSEMARY METRAILER, DESEGREGATION

FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER 141 (1977); see generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1M, 349 U.S.
294 (1955) (providing a guideline for implementing the desegregation of school districts across
the United States); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Tilting at Windmills: Brown II and the Hopeless Quest
to Resolve Deep-Seated Social Conflict Through Litigation 24 L. & INEQ. 31 (2006) (providing a
detailed examination of whether a different order in Brown II would have made a difference).
140. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
141. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
142. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 142-44.
143. Id. at 144.
144. Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary
ConstitutionalTheory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 285 (1997).
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support for its decisions to be implemented. When that support is not
sufficiently deep and widely spread, the biggest effects of Court
decisions may be more on law school casebooks than on peoples' lives.
V. CHEMERINSKY'S COURT-CENTRIC VIEW OF
THE VINDICATION OF RIGHTS

"Our rights are meaningless," Chemerinsky writes, "if they
cannot be vindicated." 145 He is absolutely right. He is mistaken,
however, in apparently believing that vindication can only come from
courts. The most important institution for the creation and protection
of rights in the United States by far is the Congress. From Social
Security to wage and hour regulations, from Medicaid and Medicare to
Obamacare, from the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, from the Equal
Pay Act, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and other civil rights acts, it is
Congress that provides the most important, most far-reaching, and
most lasting protections of rights. And where there is political support,
Congress can overturn Court decisions that fail to protect rights.
Three examples illustrate the point.
The first example is the Court's decision in General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert,146 where the Court held that a workplace disability plan
that excluded pregnancy-related disability was not sex discrimination
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Congress disagreed, rewrote the law, and the Court upheld it. 147 Similarly, the Court's
decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 148 as
Chemerinsky notes, was overturned by Congress. In this case, the
Court held that plaintiffs bringing Title VII discrimination law suits
must file an EEOC charge within 180 days after the alleged unlawful
employment practices occurred, or lose their claim. The Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, removing the 180 day limit, was the first piece
of legislation signed into law by President Obama. Third, in a series of
cases in the late 1980s, the Court narrowed the ability of plaintiffs to
bring civil rights discrimination suits under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.149 Congress responded by enacting the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, essentially returning the law to the status quo. There was
145. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 1, at 228.
146. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
147. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
148. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
149. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989) ("The ultimate
burden of proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific
employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times.").
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sufficient support for the legislation in Congress that Republican
President George H. W. Bush signed the bill. These examples show
that Congress can and does protect and extend rights much more
effectively than the Court.
Unfortunately, there are other cases where Congress has not
acted to overturn Supreme Court decisions that weaken democracy or
harm consumers and the most vulnerable members of American
society. Chemerinsky discusses some of them, including cases
shielding makers of generic drugs from liability, 150 arbitration and
class action suits, 15 1 campaign finance, 152 and voting rights. 153 Like
Chemerinsky, I find these decisions appalling and destructive. The
problem, however, is that the voters have elected a Republican
Congress that is beholden to big business and hostile to civil rights.
There is little chance that a Congress with Republican majorities will
act to overturn these decisions. The Roberts Court, as long as there is
a conservative majority in Congress, can act with little fear of
repercussions to protect business and gut campaign finance
restrictions and voting rights protections. Change will come about
only from a change in partisan makeup of Congress or the
replacement of one or more of the current conservative, Republicanappointed Supreme Court justices with liberal, Democratic-appointed
justices. The point should be clear that the kind of decisions the Court
will make, as always, will be largely determined by presidential
elections and the justices the president appoints. Change, then,
requires political organization and electoral success. It will not come
from the Court.
In several other horrific cases that Chemerinsky discusses,
some remedy was provided by non-judicial actors. For example,
Chemerinsky tells the outrageous story of master sergeant James B.
Stanely who, without his knowledge or consent, was secretly given
LSD by the Army as part of an experiment. In 1987, the Supreme
Court held that the United States had sovereign immunity, precluding
Stanley from recovering from his injuries. 154 Chemerinsky
summarizes his discussion this way: "James Stanley was left without
any remedy for the injuries he suffered."'155 Fortunately for Stanley,
this is not correct. Stanley was left without a judicial remedy but that
150. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 164-72.
151. Id. at 173-84.
152. Id. at 249-60.
153. Id. at 260-63.
154. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-84 (1987) ("Ve hold that no ...remedy
is available for injuries that 'arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.' ").
155. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 219.
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is not the equivalent of no remedy. In 1994, Congress passed a private
claims bill, and in 1966, an arbitration panel awarded Stanley
156
$400,477, the maximum amount permitted under the legislation.
Similarly, Chemerinsky tells the stories of Tommy Lee Goldstein and
John Thompson, wrongfully convicted and imprisoned. Goldstein
spent twenty-four years in prison for a crime he did not commit and
Thompson spent eighteen years, including fourteen years on death
row, for a crime he did not commit. 1 57 To make matters worse, once
exonerated neither man found relief from the Supreme Court. 15
Thus, Chemerinsky concludes, "Tommy Lee Goldstein and John
Thompson are without any recourse for all of the years they spent
wrongly imprisoned."'' 59 However, Goldstein reached a settlement with
the city of Long Beach, California, for $7.95 million. 6 0 And Thompson
is apparently statutorily entitled to $250,000 under a Louisiana
statute that awards wrongfully convicted people $25,000 per year for
each year of incarceration with a maximum payment of $250,000. To
be clear, Chemerinsky is absolutely right to criticize the Court for
these decisions. And I am pretty confident that no amount of money
can make up for the years lost from Goldstein's and Thompson's lives.
My point is that to look only the Supreme Court for the vindication of
rights is to forget that the Court is only one among many actors.
Overall, in sections II, III, IV and V, I have shown that the
actual Supreme Court, as opposed to Chemerinsky's mythical one, is
reflective of the society in which it operates. From the selection
procedure by which its members are chosen, to its vulnerability to
threats from the other branches, to its dependence on their support,
the Court will almost always reflect mainstream views. In times of
war or crisis, when public and elite opinion favors repression, so will
the Court. If and when the Court does issue decisions furthering the
rights of the relatively disadvantaged, its lack of power means its
decisions can be thwarted unless support for them is widespread and
deep. But all is not lost because the Court is neither the most
156. Bob Erlandson, Ex-Sergeant Compensated for LSD Experiments Tests by Army, CIA
Done at Edgewood, BALT. SUN (Mar. 7, 1996), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1996-0307/news/1996067079_1stanley-lsd-fort-knox [https://perma.cc/RKV8-QYA6].
157. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 192-95.
158. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71-72 (2011) (reversing lower courts' decisions
to hold Connick, as policymaker for the district attorney's office, liable for damages to
Thompson); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 349 (2009) (per curium) (holding that the
prosecutors in Goldstein's trial possessed absolute immunity against the charges).
159. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 225.
160. Rebecca Cathcart, Wrongly Convicted Man Gets $7.95 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/us/13goldstein.html [https://perma.cc/9SV5JUSQ].
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important nor the most efficacious institution for protecting and
furthering rights. Chemerinsky's Court-centric focus leads him to
overlook the crucial role of the political process in extending rights
and, sometimes, in providing remedies even where courts fail to do so.
The sobering reality is that in the democratic system of the United
Sates, rights do not trump politics, as much as Chemerinsky wishes
they did.
VI. REFORM PROPOSALS: ADDRESSING THE WRONG PROBLEMS
In the penultimate chapter of the book, Chemerinsky makes
recommendations that he believes "would change the Court
significantly for the better."161 His proposals include merit selection
for both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, 162 term
limits for Supreme Court justices,1 63 changes to the confirmation
process, 164 and a host of recommendations to provide the public more
information about the Court's actions. 165 Only one of these proposals,
term limits, has the potential to make much difference in the decisions
of the Court. The others, although sensible, do not speak to the root
cause of the problem, structural and institutional constraints that
produce a Court that more often than not protects unequal privilege
and power.
A. Merit Selection
Merit selection of judges confuses ability with values. In the
last several decades the caliber of Supreme Court Justices has been
very high. Two political scientists, Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover,
have examined the qualifications of Supreme Court nominees starting
in 1937 with Justice Black. They rank justices on a scale of 0 (least
qualified) to 1 (most qualified) based on newspaper editorials from two
liberal and two conservative newspapers from the time of nomination
to the Senate vote. Table 1 presents the rankings of the members of
the Roberts Court serving in 2015, before the death of Justice Scalia.
As the data show, only one justice, Thomas, was rated below .5.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
Supreme

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 297.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 310-12.
Id. at 302-10.
Id. at 324-25 (explicitly stating suggestions for improving communication by the
Court).
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Table 1
Sgal-Cover Qualification Scores,
Roberts Court, 20161"
Republican-Appointed Democratic-Appointed
Justices
Justices
Justice

Score

Justice

Score

Scalia
Kennedy
Thomas
Alito
R oberts
Average

1.000
.890
415
.810
.970
.817

Ginsburg
Breyer
Sotomayor
Kagan

1.000
.545
.810
730
.771

.771

The remaining four justices appointed by Republican presidents have
qualifications equal to or exceeding three of the Democratic-appointed
justices. Indeed, even including Justice Thomas in the calculation, the
Republican-appointed justices were perceived as better qualified than
the Democratic-appointed justices at the time of their nominations
and appointment. What about the Warren Court, the Court that
inspired Chemerinsky to become a lawyer? The average qualification
score of the sixteen justices who served with Chief Justice Warren
(including Warren) is .77, below that of the Republican-appointed
members of the Roberts Court. The problem with the Court, then, is
not the qualifications of its members.
What about the quality of appointees to the lower federal
courts? Chemerinsky praises President Carter for creating the United
States Circuit Court Nominating Commission to recommend nominees
based on "merit" rather than cronyism. 167 President Carter also urged
Senators to establish similar commissions for federal district court
169
nominations. 16 'The results," Chemerinsky writes, "were stunning."

He appears to mean by this that "Carter's approach substantially
increased the diversity of the federal bench-" He also writes that his
"sense is that Carter's picks to the federal courts of appeals were the

166. Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of Supreme Court
Justces. 83 Ak. POL. SCL REV. 557 (1989), httpJ/www.stonybrookedu/commms/polisci/segal/
QualTable.pdf [httpsJ/permiLcc/E7K7-2J8L].
167. CHFmEmNSff. supra note 1. at 300-01168. For scholarly studies of the work of the nominating commissions, see generally Larry CBerkson and Susan B. Carbon, The United States Circuit Judge Nominating Commission: Its
Member., Pioceduresand Candidates,A. JUDICATURE SOC'Y (1980); and Alan NefL The United
States DistrictJudge Nominating Commissions. Thew Members, Proceduresand Candidates.AlL

JUDICATURE Soc'Y (1981).
169. CHELmRJsKY, supra note 1, at 300.
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best in terms of consistent merit of any president" over the past
170
several decades.
For many decades, political scientist Sheldon Goldman has
been collecting and analyzing a broad array of data on federal judicial
court nominations. Examining President Carter's appointments,
Goldman found that in terms of gender and race, Carter surpassed
past presidents. On the district court level, 14.4% of his appointees
were women, many times higher than past presidents. Similarly,
13.9% of his federal district court nominees were black, again many
times higher than past presidents. 171 Carter's circuit court appointees
were historically diverse as well. In terms of gender, 19.6% were
women, compared to no female appointees for both Presidents Ford
and Nixon, and only 2.5% for President Johnson. 172 As for race, 16.1%
of Carter's circuit court appointees were black. Neither Presidents
Ford nor Nixon appointed an African-American to the circuit courts
and only 5% of President Johnson's circuit court appointees were
black. 173
Presidents who followed Carter continued to appoint female
and black judges. In terms of gender, while Reagan appointed a
smaller percentage of women to both the federal district and circuit
courts than did Carter, subsequent presidents equaled or surpassed
Carter. For example, 20.7% of President George W. Bush's district
court appointees were female,1 74 as were 25.4% of his circuit court
appointees.1 75 And in his first six years in office, President Obama's
district court appointees were 41.2% female and his circuit court
appointees were 46.8% female, breaking all previous records. 176 As for
race, the record is less good. President Clinton (17.4%) and President
Obama in his first six years (18.4%) appointed a higher percentage of
African-Americans to the federal district courts than did Carter. Only
President Obama exceeded Carter's appointments of AfricanAmericans to the circuit court, with 19.1% of his appointees being
African-American in his first six years. 77 Chemerinsky is correct to
praise Carter for the diversity of his federal judicial appointments.

170. Id. at 301.
171. Sheldon Goldman, Carter'sJudicial Appointments: A Lasting Legacy, 64 JUDICATURE
344, 348 (1981).
172. Id. at 350.
173. Id.
174. Elliot Slotnick, Sheldon Goldman & Sara Schiavoni, Writing the Book of Judges: Part 1
Obama's JudicialAppointments Record after Six Years, 3 J.L. & CTS. 331, 356 (2015).
175. Id. at 364.
176. Id. at 356, 364.
177. Id.
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What about their merit? Were Carter's nominees chosen for
their political commitments to the Democratic party or where they
chosen on meritocractic grounds without regard to their partisan
activities as Chemerinsky suggests? Goldman recorded the party
identification and past party activism of each appointee. In terms of
party affiliation, a whopping 94.1% of Carter's district court
appointees were Democrats, higher than the proportion of President
1 78
Ford's and Nixon's district court appointees who were Republican.
On the federal circuit courts, President Carter's appointees were
89.3% Democrats, a bit lower than but roughly in line with past
presidents. 179 As for past party activism, 60.4% of Carter's district
court nominees and 73.2% of his circuit court appointees were
politically active for the Democrats, surpassing the percentages of the
appointees of Presidents Ford, Nixon and Johnson who were
politically active.18 0 For example, the difference between the past
party activism of President Carter's and President Nixon's appointees
was 11.8 percentage points for district court appointees and 13.2
percentage points for circuit court appointees. 181 So President Carter's
federal court appointees, influenced by "merit" selection, were
predominately politically active Democrats. No wonder Chemerinsky
likes them so much!
The presidents who followed Carter continued to appoint party
activists to the federal courts, but at a lower rate than did Carter.
With the exception of the first President Bush (64.2%), the district
court appointees of the presidents who followed Carter had a lower
rate of party activism. For example, 52.5% of President George W.
Bush's federal district court nominees were party activists, 7.9
percentage points lower than Carter's rate. 8 2 With the circuit courts,
President Carter appointed party activists at a higher rate than all
the presidents who followed him, exceeding the rates of Republican
Presidents Reagan (66.7%) by 6.5 percentage points, George H. W.
Bush (70.3%) by 2.9 percentage points and George W. Bush (67.8%) by
18 3
5.4 percentage points.
The American Bar Association
(ABA) assesses the
qualifications of federal judicial nominees. President Carter's
nominees are not appreciably different than those of past presidents.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Goldman, supra note 171, at 348.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 348, 350.
Id.
Slotnick et al., supra note 174, at 357.
Id. at 364.
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If anything, the ABA ranked his appointees slightly lower. On the
district court level, 4% of Carter's appointees were ranked
"exceptionally well qualified," a bit lower than Nixon's appointees and
only slightly more than half (54%) the percentage of Johnson's
appointees who were ranked extremely well qualified.18 4 A slightly
higher percentage were ranked "well qualified" and a slightly lower
percentage were ranked "qualified" than the nominees of past recent
presidents.1 8 5 For the circuit courts, 16.1% of Carter's appointees were
ranked "exceptionally well qualified," a rate slightly lower than Ford's,
a bit higher than Nixon's and almost 60% lower than Johnson's
appointees. 186
The ABA changed its rating system after Carter left office,
making comparisons inexact. Under the revised ratings, the ratings
are "well qualified," "qualified," and "not qualified." Adding the Carter
ratings of "exceptionally well qualified" and "well qualified" together
allows for a rough comparison. On this measure, 51% of Carter's
district court appointees were well qualified, a lower rate than the
presidents who followed him. Indeed, 70.1% of President George W.
18 7
Bush's district court appointees received a ranking of well qualified.
With the circuit courts, 75% of Carter's appointees were ranked well
qualified, a higher rate than the appointees of Presidents Reagan,
George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, but lower than Presidents
188
Clinton and Obama through the latter's first six years in office.
Overall, Chemerinsky's claim about the quality of President Carter's
"merit" federal court appointees lacks support. They appear to be
largely liberal Democrats who share Chemerinsky's values.
B. Term Limits
Chemerinsky recommends that Supreme Court justices be
term-limited. He appears to support an eighteen-year term. This
recommendation, supported by data, experience, and the findings of
the branch relations literature, makes sense. As he notes, the average
length of service of justices has increased dramatically over the last
several decades. In 2015, for example, a majority of the justices had
served for over twenty years. This includes Justices Scalia (30

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Goldman, supra note 171, at 348.
Id.
Id. at 350.
Slotnick et al., supranote 174, at 356.
Id. at 364.
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years),18 9 Kennedy (28 years), Thomas (25 years), Ginsburg (23 years),
and Breyer (22 years). The challenge judicial longevity presents is that
justices may out-serve the political coalition that appointed them. A
result may be judicial obstinance in the face of political change. The
classic example of this is the New Deal, where the Court was
threatened with being packed before it came into line with the new
political reality. In 1937, two of the conservative justices, McReynolds
and Van Devanter, had served for more than eighteen years. If they
had been replaced, the Court-packing scheme may not have been
necessary. 190
A related proposal is to adopt a mandatory retirement age. As
Chemerinsky notes, none of the fifty states have life tenure, nor do
other democracies. 19 1 In 1937 a majority of the justices were seventyfive years old or older. A mandatory retirement age of seventy-five
would have avoided the New Deal crisis all together. On the Roberts
Court of 2016, after the death of Justice Scalia, a mandatory
retirement age would remove three of the four longest serving
justices-all except Justice Thomas.
C. The ConfirmationProcess and Improved Communication
Chemerinsky argues for a more openly ideological confirmation
process as well as more communication by the Court. Neither will
make much difference in the role of the Court. Complaining that the
current confirmation process for Supreme Court justices is "an
exercise in Kabuki theater," 192 Chemerinsky urges that it is "time to
create a more meaningful confirmation process." 193 It is not clear what
difference this will make other than to remove the level of hypocrisy
that surrounds the process. Chemerinsky admits as much at the
94
conclusion of his section on the confirmation process. 1
Similarly, the host of recommendations Chemerinsky makes
for improving communications by the Court will have little effect.
Decades-old literature informs us that most Americans aren't
189. Justice Scalia died on February 13, 2016, after thirty years of service. Adam Liptak,
Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html [https://perma.ccCX7D-R5L5].
190. Whether the Court would have accepted the New Deal absent a threat depends on who
replaced Justices McReynolds and Van Devanter. McReynolds would have resigned in the
Coolidge Administration and Van Devanter in the waning months of the Hoover Administration.
191. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 311.
192. Id. at 303 (quoting then-Senator Joseph Biden, chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee).
193. Id. at 304.
194. Id. at 310.
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interested in, and do not follow, what the Supreme Court does. The
Supreme Court Compendium, presenting thirty-eight tables of public
opinion data, notes the "stunning picture of the American public's
general ignorance of the Court and its day-to-day activity." 195 This is
in part because very few decisions are given more than episodic
treatment in the media. 196 Since the "vast majority of information
Americans learn about Supreme Court decisions comes from the news
media," 197 most Americans will remain blissfully unaware of what the
Court does. They become engaged when political elites and interest
groups mobilize them. 198 And political elites and interest groups are
aware of what the Court does. Providing more information to an uninterested public will not make a difference. Chemerinsky's
recommendations will help lawyers and scholars; they will not make a
difference for everyday citizens.
VII. JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM

"The Court's performance over the past two decades,"1 99
Chemerinsky writes, leads him to question the practice of judicial
review. In the end, however, he argues for the maintenance of the
status quo because he believes that the Court can do much good, if it
only it lives up to its proper role as he understands it. Alas, as I have
argued throughout this Essay, the Court will not do so. Historically,
the practice of judicial review has done more harm than good to those
lacking power and privilege. And in those relatively rare instances
when the Court has sided with the relatively disadvantaged, its
decisions have only improved their treatment when there was
substantial elite and popular support to do so. This is not to argue
that Supreme Court decisions do not matter. Of course they do! They
can have all sorts of effects, some positive and many profoundly
negative. 200 But what they cannot do is to protect the vulnerable when
the broader society is unwilling to do so.

195. LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 738 (6th ed. 2015).

196. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66 (2000);
Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the
Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352, 357 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
197.

MICHAEL A. ZILIS, THE LIMITS OF LEGITIMACY 5 (2015).

198. Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 196, at 355.
199. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 271.
200. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Impact of Courts on American Life, in BENCHMARK: JUDGING
COURTS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 280, 281 (Kermit Hall & Kevin McGuire eds., 2005).

1112

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:4:1075

For Chemerinsky, the "most powerful" argument for judicial
20 1
review is "the need to enforce the limits of the Constitution."
Tellingly, to reach this position Chemerinsky ignores the preceding
275 pages of his book where he argued that the Court has repeatedly
failed to do so! He is unwilling to let go, arguing, despite all the
evidence that he has presented, that the Court will still protect
minorities against prejudiced majorities and uphold constitutional
rights against repressive ones. Once again, Chemerinsky's longing for
the triumph of rights over politics, his love for a mythical Court,
20 2
clouds his vision.
The choice Chemerinsky presents, the status quo or the
abolition of judicial review, overlooks alternatives. Chief among them
is continuing with the Court's power of judicial review while vesting
appellate power over decisions invalidating state and federal laws in
Congress. This is neither a new nor radical proposal. The great Chief
Justice John Marshall himself suggested giving the Senate appellate
power over the Court. 203 Other democracies that do as well as or better
than the United States in protecting minority rights either lack fullfledged judicial review (the U.K., New Zealand), lack a constitutional
bill of rights (New Zealand, Australia), or allow for legislative override
of judicial decisions (Canada). Other scholars, particularly Mark
Tushnet, have developed the case for more democratic alternatives
20 4
than the either/or choice that Chemerinsky presents.
The reader who has plowed through all I have written may
think she has found a contradiction in my argument. Throughout this
Essay I have argued that the Court is fundamentally a majoritarian
institution, one that is more or less in line with political preferences
and public opinion, and only one among several institutions that act to
protect and enlarge rights. Why, then, do I care about judicial review?
Doesn't it follow that the Court will only exercise it in support of
majority preferences? The logic behind this concern is sound.
However, practice teaches us that the relationship between Court
action and political preferences is not perfect. Although it may be the
case that absent elite and popular support the Court can accomplish
201. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 276.
202. There is both an older and a newer, growing literature in the U.S. that challenges the
belief that judicial review is a positive good. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, LEGAL
ESSAYS 40 (1908); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999);

Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against JudicialReview, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
203. Letter from John Marshall to Samuel Chase (January 23, 1805), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL 347 (Charles F. Hobson & Fredrika J. Trute eds., 1990).
204. See generally MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008).
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little over the long term, it does not follow that the Court cannot do
short-term damage. For example, in two cases in the first few decades
of the twentieth century the Court protected child labor from
congressional attempts to ban it.205 In the end, of course, the Court
lost as public opinion and elections brought it into line during the New
Deal. However, for several decades the Court protected child labor,
stunting the lives of untold numbers of children. The practice of
judicial review can and has done harm to the most vulnerable in the
society.
CONCLUSION

Towards the end of the book Chemerinsky writes, "I have spent
the past thirty-five years arguing appeals.., on behalf of those who
have been convicted of crimes and those whose civil liberties have
been violated." 20 6 I admire his convictions, and his actions, but not his
analysis of the role of the Court. The problem of the Supreme Court is
not simply that too often justices make decisions that Chemerinsky
does not like. If that were the case, then all one would have to do is to
appoint "better" justices. The underlying problem is structural. It will
only be solved if the role of the Court is reduced. Tinkering around the
margins, as Chemerinsky proposes, will do little.
The "Supreme Court," Chemerinsky writes in the beginning of
the book, "is not the institution that I once revered." 20 7Alas for
Chemerinsky, as C. Herman Pritchett put it in 1968, the "Supreme
20 8
Court isn't what it used to be; and what's more, it never was."

205. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918).
206. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 292.
207. Id. at 5.
208. WALTER F. MURPHY, JOSEPH TANENHAUS & DANIEL L. KASTNER, PUBLIC EVALUATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 29 (1973).

